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ii. 
PREFACE 
The following series of experiments explored factors which 
influence the time required to shift attention between working 
memory and visual perception. I believe it is important for 
psychology to study switching time, as it gives one a unique 
empirical method for assessing the capabilities of human 
information processing. This study makes use of the switching 
time paradigm originated by Dr. Robert Weber. This paradigm is a 
promising means of studying attention switching and may have 
practical as well as scholarly value. 
I wish to express my deepest appreciation to Dr. Weber for 
his wisdom, guidance, and encouragement. I would also like to 
thank the other members of my committee, Dr. Donald Fromme, Dr. 
Diana Byrd, and Dr. Micheal Folk for their advice and assistance. 
Also, special thanks go to Rick Gowdy and Kevin Polk for making 
the long hours spent preparing this document a little more 
bearable. 
My wife, Della, through her love, encouragement, and 
steadfast support made this dream a reality. I would like to 
dedicate this dissertation to her, to my mother, who has always 
been there when I needed her, and finally, to my father. 
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PRIMING EFFECTS IN SWITCHING ATTENTION BETWEEN 
WORKING MEMORY AND VISUAL PERCEPTION 
The time it takes to switch attention has been a topic of interest 
to cognitive psychologists in the last two decades because it 
represents a limitation on human information processing capabilities. 
By studying switching time and those variables which have an effect on 
the time required to switch attention, it is possible to gain valuable 
clues as to the functioning of the control processes which govern 
attention's focus. A number of methods have been used to study the 
time required to shift attention. These methods are reviewed in 
Appendix A. One recently developed method which holds a great deal of 
promise is the switching time paradigm (Weber, Blagowsky, & Mankin, 
1982). 
The switching time paradigm has been used to investigate switching 
attention between outputs of varying magnitude (Weber, Blagowsky, & 
Mankin, 1982; Mankin, 1983). These studies used both a method and a 
switching time formula which has proven to be a useful way of analyzing 
switching time data, and which is used in the current research. The 
switching time formula is as follows: Switching time = (alt -
((a+b)/2)/# of switches, where alt =time required to alternate between 
t~sks, a = time required to do the first task only, and b = time 
required to do the second task only. 
Analysis of switching time between inputs using the switching time 
paradigm has only recently been undertaken. Weber, Byrd, and Noll 
(1984) examined the time required to switch between working memory and 
1 
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visual perception. In the first experiment it took an average of about 
290 msec to perform such a switch. This switching time effect was 
found to be impervious to practice. The second experiment varied the 
size of the letter lists held in working memory or processed 
perceptually. The results indicated that as list length increased 
(thus imposing a greater load on working memory), switching time also 
increased. In addition, longer list lengths produced a dramatic 
increase in errors. This suggests that switching attention in this 
situation may be effected by the working memory load, and that working 
memory and the switching process may share the same limited capacity. 
Visual perception and working memory are often required in the 
processing of widely varying stimuli. The type of stimuli involved may 
affect the time it takes to execute a working memory-visual perception 
switch. The following experiments examined memory-perceprtion 
attention switching; specifically, these experiments explored how the 
relatedness among the stimuli held in memory and processed perceptually 
affects the time required to execute a memory-perceptual attention 
switch. 
One type of relatedness that could affect a memory-perceptual 
attention switch is semantic relatedness. Semantic relatedness has 
been shown to have an affect on item recognition (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 
1973; Loftus, 1973). That is, the presentation of an item "primes" 
closely related items (items of the same category), making subsequent 
recognition of those items faster. The effect of the relatedness of 
stimuli in attention switching has not been determined. 
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Two classes of models concerning the effect of concept relatedness 
on processing in memory make differing predictions for attention 
switching. One class of models predicts a priming effect when 
attention is switched between closely related stimuli while the other 
predicts an interference effect for this same situation. One model 
included in the class predicting priming effects is the spatial model 
of semantic attention (Hutchinson & Lockhead, 1977; Lockhead, Gaylord, 
& Evans, 1977). This model states that attention travels through 
semantic space in an anolog fashion, somewhat like a spaceship 
traveling different distances in space; the farther separated the two 
concepts, the longer the travel time required. Figure 1 is a 
representation of the spatial model of semantic memory. 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
There are other types of attention switches that have been found 
to operate in an analog fashion. Shulman, Remington, & McLean (1979), 
in an ingenious series of experiments, found support for the analog 
movement of attention across the visual field. Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser 
(1978) found similar effects in the movement of attention across mental 
images. In addition, Axelrod & Powazek (1972) found evidence 
suggesting that the rate of switching between the ears depends on the 
angular separation between the sound sources, with larger angles 
corresponding to longer switching times. 
The second model which belongs to the class of models predicting 
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the existence of priming effects in attention switching is The 
spreading activation model (Collins & Loftus, 1975). According to this 
model, when one concept in memory is activated, this activation can 
spread along connections in the semantic network to other nearby 
concepts. 
The second class of attention switching models predicting that 
related items may cause difficulty in switching attention includes 
lateral inhibition and interference explanations of memory processes. 
Lateral inhibition occurs most notably in vision (Naka & Witkovsky, 
1972). Light enters the eye in rather diffuse patterns. The 
stimulation of certain cells in the retina tends to inhibit the 
activity of other nearby cells. This activity results in the sharp 
images we see in vision. Whether it occurs in processing sematic 
material has not been determined. Figure 2 is a representation of the 
lateral inhibition model. 
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
An interference view would maintain that related items may 
interfere with one another. Visually processing an item may cause 
confusion if a closely related item is held in working memory. 
The purpose of this series of experiments was to determine the 
effect of the relatedness of stimuli involved in a working 
memory-visual perception attention switch on the time required to 
execute such an attention switch. In the following experiments, the 
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relatedness of stimulus items involved in a working memory-visual 
perception switching situation was varied in two ways. First, the 
category membership of the items was varied; subjects were required to 
switch attention with items from a single category in both working 
memory and visual perception, and with items from two separate 
categories in memory and perception. Second, the semantically 
referenced size of items switched between was manipulated, such that at 
times the magnitude of the size difference between the items involved 
was either large or small. 
In Experiment 1, subjects were required to perform two types of 
switching operations: a) within-category switching, which involves 
switching between items belonging to the same se~antic category and b) 
between-category switching, which involves switching between items 
belonging to different semantic categories. Thus, the purpose of the 
first experiment was to determine which view of semantic attention 
switching best describes the operation of the working memory-visual 
perception switch. If switching within a single category is faster 
than switching between categories (such as switching between letters 
and numbers) it would be consistent with priming effects occuring in 
attention switching. However, if switching between categories is 
accomplished more rapidly than switching within a category, it would 
support a lateral inhibition or interference view of semantic attention 
switching. 
This experiment employed two types of stimuli in an effort to 
determine which of the models most adequately accounts for switching 
between semantic categories in memory and perception. The stimuli vary 
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in the nature of their semantic classes. They are: a) character 
stimuli, letters of the alphabet and digits and b) words. The word 
categories used were two of the six superordinate categories normed for 
typicality by Rosch and Mervis (1975). The categories selected (words, 
digits, and letters) were chosen to provide a broad range of categories 
and thereby to test the range of applicability of any switching time 
effects. 
The pilot data suggested that the two classes of stimuli 
(letters/digits and words) would behave similarly in terms of switching 
time. If this were the result, it would support an argument for a 
substantial generality for switching effects between memory and 
perception. 
However, it was possible that the two types of stimuli would bring 
about divergent results. If this were true, there would be a number of 
explanations, depending on exactly what differences presented 
themselves. For example, a facilitation effect might have been found 
in switching between similar lists when word stimuli were used, but not 
when character stimuli were involved. Such a result would have occured 
if character stimuli are organized differently in memory than word 
stimuli. 
Experiment 1 A 
Method 
Subjects. Subjects were 20 undergraduate psychology students at 
Oklahoma State University who received extra credit for their 
participation. The age ranges were from 18 to 25 years, An equal 
number of male and female subjects were involved in the experiment. 
7 
Stimuli. Four lists of stimuli were used: two lists of character 
stimuli and two lists comprised of the ten most typical members of two 
common categories. The two character lists were as follows: 1) the 
first 10 nonconsecutive consonants of the alphabet (B,D,F,H,J,L,N,P,R, 
and T), and 2) the ten single digits (0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, and 9). The 
two word categories were from those defined by Rosch & Mervis (1975) as 
explained above. The categories are clothing (pants, sweater, socks, 
shoes, vest, dress, coat, shirt, jacket, hat), and vehicles (car, boat, 
bus, trolley, train, tank, truck, raft, tractor, sled). The stimuli 
were presented to the subjects on a black and white video monitor by 
means of an Apple II computer. 
Procedure. The experiment was a 2 X 2 X 4 within subjects design, 
with two major classes of stimuli used (characters and words) , two 
categories of stimuli nested within each class (letters and numbers 
within the character class, and clothing and vehicles within the word 
class), and four types of trials (memory alone, perception alone, 
alternating within a category, and alternating between categories). 
There were 16 possible types of experimental trials which were randomly 
presented to subjects in a single block of trials. The 16 trial types 
are shown in Table 1. In order to calculate a switching time, three 
types of trials are necessary: 1) memory alone, 2) perception alone, 
and 3) alternating between perception and memory. 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
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For the perception mode, the subject read perceptual information 
as rapidly as possible. First, the subject saw a series of three 
asterisks (or three groups of asterisks in the conditions using words) 
for a four second duration. Following this display, the screen was 
cleared, the computer's timer routine was started, and a second display 
of three stimuli (letters, numbers, vehicle names, or clothing names, 
depending on the condition) was presented four lines below the previous 
display. The subject's task was to read aloud the stimuli presented on 
the screen as quickly as possible, beginning with the presentation of 
the second display, and pressing the space bar when the task was 
completed. Pressing the space bar stopped the timer and recorded the 
time that particular trial has taken. After a three second interval, 
the next randomly determined trial began. 
For the memory mode, the subject unloaded information from working 
memory as rapidly as possible. First, the subject saw a series of 
three stimuli for a duration of four seconds. The subject was to 
remember the list in order. Following this display, the screen was 
cleared, the timer started, and a series of asterisks were presented 
four lines below the previous display. As soon as the asterisk display 
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was presented, the subject's task was to rapidly say aloud the items of 
the list he/she was asked to remember, pressing the space bar when 
finished. Again, the time it took the subject to complete the task was 
recorded. 
In the alternating trials, the subject alternated between 
information in perception and in memory as rapidly as possible. First, 
the subject was presented a series of three stimuli for a four-second 
duration. The subject was instructed to remember the list in order. 
Following this display, the screen was cleared, the timer started, and 
another series of three stimuli was presented four lines below the 
first. The task was to alternate saying one stimulus item from the 
perceptual list (the second display, which remained on the screen) and 
then one item from the memory list (the first display) as quickly as 
possible until the subject had said aloud all six stimulus items for 
that trial. The subject was to press the space bar when the task was 
completed. Again, the time it took for task to be completed was 
recorded. 
The following is an example of the alternating mode, character 
stimuli, within-category condition. If a subject were presented the 
letters L N P in the first list, followed by B D F in the second list, 
the correct response would be B-L-D-N-F-P. Subjects were instructed to 
always start with the first stimulus item of the second display. 
Stimulus items in the first display were never duplicated in the second 
display, and the character stimulus items were never mixed with the 
word stimulus items. 
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Each trial was scored for errors during its execution. A strict 
criterion was used. A trial was considered an error if a nonappearing 
stimulus item was added, if a stimulus item was omitted, or if any of 
the items were said out of sequence. 
Subjects were required to sort the word stimuli into two 
categories to insure that the categories used were discernable to the 
subjects. All subjects were able to successfully sort the stimuli into 
the appropriate categories. 
Results and Discussion. 
Figure 3 displays the switching time results for character and 
word stimuli calculated using the switching time formula. The major 
result of the first experiment is that within- category switching takes 
less time to execute than between-category switching. An analysis of 
variance was performed on the data, involving 4 stimulus types 
(letters, numbers, clothing, and vehicles) X 2 switching conditions 
(within-category and between-category) X 2 stimulus classes (words and 
characters) X 2 sexes. Significant interactions were observed for 
stimulus class X switching condition, F (1,18) 11.39, p < .0034, and 
stimulus type in memory X switching condition, F (2,36) 5.07, p < 
• 0115. 
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
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Simple effects tests were also conducted. The two types of 
switching conditions were found to.be significantly different for word 
stimuli, F (1,36) = 40.14, p <.01, but not for character stimuli, F 
(1,36) = 3.49, p <.10. A similar analysis for each stimulus type in 
memory found the switching conditions significantly different for 
clothing in memory, F (1,54) = 40.14, p <.01, and for vehicles in 
memory, F (1,54) = 10.59, p <.01, but not for letters in memory, F 
(1,54) = 2.41, p <.25, or for numbers in memory, F (1,54) = 2.29, p < 
.25. In other words, only when word stimuli were involved were the 
switching times for within category and between category switching 
significantly different. The analysis of variance is summarized in 
Table 2, and the simple effects tests in Table 3. 
Insert Table 2 And 
Table 3 About here 
The switching time differences found for within-category switching 
and between-category switch~ng provide support for those models which 
predict that switching between items belonging to the same category 
should be more rapid than switching between items from different 
categories. The spatial model of semantic memory makes such a 
prediction; if attention travels through semantic space in an analog 
fashion, travel time between more closely related items should be less 
than the travel time required between less related items. 
Another view of memory processes which explains the results is the 
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spreading activation model. According to this view, attention directed 
at one item in a category may raise the activation level of other 
nearby items, thus priming them for subsequent retrieval. Priming 
would be expected to occur to a greater extent in within-category 
switching than in between-category switching. 
A major disadvantage of the current study is its inability to 
discriminate between these two models. This drawback is not unique to 
the current study. Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971), for example, discuss 
the difficulty involved in experimentally distinguishing a 
location-shifting model of priming from a spreading activation model of 
priming. Both types of models account equally well for the body of 
research done on priming effects. 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
The results cannot be attributed to a speed-accuracy trade-off. 
Correlation coeficients were calculated between the number of errors 
committed in a condition and the mean performance time per item for 
that condition. The correlation coeficients are displayed in Table 4. 
No significant positive or negative correlations were observed, nor was 
any pattern discernable. If a negative correlation had been found, it 
might have indicated that subjects attempted to adjust their pace 
because of the possibility of making an error. 
Differences for within-category and between-category switching 
were found for character stimuli as well. However, these diffferences 
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were not significant. One possible explanation for this lack of a 
significant effect for character stimuli is that letters and numbers 
may be stored more closely together than words from different semantic 
categories. Thus, these two types of character stimuli may have 
behaved much as though they were members of the same category. 
In Figure 3, when comparing the switching times for the numbers in 
memory and letters in memory for both within-category and 
between-category switching, it is evident that the letters in memory 
condition takes longer for each type of switching. Newrnann-Kuel's 
Multiple Range Tests find the two stimuli in memory conditions 
significantly different for both types of switching, C.diff = 6S.55, p 
< .OS. This may be the result of a memory load effect. Letters have 
been found to take up more space in working memory than numbers 
(Cavanaugh, 1978). An increase in working memory load may bring about 
an increase in switching time, as found in Weber, Byrd, and Noll 
(1984). 
For the word stimuli in the within- category alternating 
conditions, a Newrnann-Kuel's test found the difference for switching 
between two lists of clothing and two lists of vehicles is not 
significant, C.diff = 65.SS, p > .OS. In the between-category 
alternating condition, however, when clothing is held in memory and 
vehicles processed perceptually, switching times are 70.92 msec slower 
than when the positions of the stimuli are reversed. A Newmann-Kuel's 
test found this difference to be significant, C.diff = 65.5S, p <.OS. 
It is doubtful that a memory load effect accounts for this difference, 
because one would expect such an effect to appear in the within 
category conditions as well. Some type of interference effect may be 
responsible, but its exact nature has not been determined. 
No significant gender effects were found in the analysis of the 
switching time data. 
Insert Figure 4 About Here 
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Figure 4 displays the mean performance times per item for the 
memory alone, perception alone within-category alternating, and 
between-category alternating conditions. The mean performance times 
are the raw scores which are used to calculate switching times. A 4 X 
4 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance, consisting of four stimulus types 
(letters, numbers, clothing, and vehicles), four modes of presentation 
(memory alone, perception alone, within-category alternating, and 
between-category alternating), two stimulus classes (words and 
characters), and two sexes, was performed on the mean performance times 
per item for all cells in the design. Table 5 summarizes the results 
of this analysis. Significant interactions were observed for stimulus 
class X mode of presentation, F (3,54) = 5.07, p < .0038, and for 
stim~lus type X mode of presentation, F (6,108) = 4.39, p < .0005. No 
gender effects were observed in this analysis, and the observed effects 
accounted for .28 of the total variance. 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
Simple effects test were conducted to find the differences 
involved in the interactions. Mode of presentation was found to be 
significant for character stimuli, F (3,108) = 52.08, p < .01. 
Subsequent Newmann-Kuel's tests demonstrated that for character 
stimuli, only the within- category and between-category alternating 
conditions are not significantly different, C.diff = 38.9, p > .05. 
These conditions are shown in Figure 4. This is not surprising, in 
light of the fact that when switching times are calculated, the two 
conditions are not significantly different. 
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For word stimuli, the perception alone trials and the 
within-category alternation trials, shown in Figure 4, are the only 
modes of perception not significantly different from one another, 
C.diff = 38.9, p > .05. A number of factors combines to make these two 
conditions statistically equivalent. More processing time was added to 
the perception alone conditions as compared to the within-category 
alternating condition in that the perception alone condition required 
six items to be visually processed, in comparison to three for the 
within-category alternating condition. However, switching time from 
working memory to visual perception was added to the time required to 
complete the within-category alternating condition. Evidently, the 
effects of these factors balanced each other in such a way as to make 
the two conditions statistically equivalent. 
Insert Table 6 About Here 
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Simple effects tests found word and character stimuli to be 
significantly different for all modes of presentation. These simple 
effects tests are included in Table 6. This effect can clearly be seen 
in Figure 4, when comparing the conditions using clothing and vehicle 
stimuli to those using letters and numbers. This makes intuitive 
sense, as word stimuli are more complex and have a much larger set of 
possible responses than character stimuli. In addition, a number of 
disyllabic words were included in the study, which made responses in 
the conditions using words take longer. 
Figure 4 shows the difference between perception alone and memory 
alone trials is about 70-80 msec. per item. A Newrnann-Kuel's test 
demonstrated that this differnce is significant, C.diff = 38.9, p < 
.OS. This difference probably occurs because an extra processing step 
must be accomplished in the perception alone trials, namely item 
recognition. For the memory condition this step occur when the items 
are first exposed, before the asterisks cue retrieval and start the 
timer in the memory trials. 
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Experiment 1 B 
One question of interest is what effect practice will have on the 
category sw~tching effects found in the first experiment. Weber, 
Blagowsky, and Mankin (1982) found that speech intensity switching is 
remarkably impervious to practice. At issue is whether semantic 
categories, as employed in Experiment 1 A, are also impervious to 
practice, or whether the semantic system is more flexible or plastic in 
its organization. It may be that repeated switching between concepts 
may effect the storage of those concepts in such a way as to facilitate 
subsequent switching. This process might occur in one of two ways: a) 
memory structures may be altered such that the semantic distance 
between the concepts is lessened, or b) the links between concepts may 
be "strengthened" such that one can more easily move attention from one 
concept to the other. If either view is accurate, one would expect the 
category effects found using words in experiment 1 A to dissipate with 
practice. It may also be the case that memory structures are more 
permanent in regard to attention switching. In this case, the category 
switching effects may withstand repeated practice. 
Experiement 1 B is designed to study the effect of practice on 
switching attention between working memory and visual perception. 
Method 
Subjects. Two subjects, graduate students from the psychology 
department at Oklahoma State University, were involved in the 
experiment. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 A, 
except that the subjects were involved in three experimental sessions 
held on three consecutive days, with each session consisting of 160 
trials (10 trials per condition). 
Results and Discussion. 
Switching·times were calculated for the alternating conditions. 
The switching time results are included in Figures 5 and 6, and 
mean performance time results are displayed in Figures 7 and 8. 
Insert Figure 5 and 
Figure 6 About Here 
Because of the small number of subjects involved, no statistical tests 
of significance were calculated for the data. 
The results of the experiment failed to completely replicate the 
effects found in the first experiment, even on the first day of 
testing. It is difficult to make definite conclusions based on two 
subjects, especially in light of the large amount of variability in 
this particular task, as evidenced in the large standard deviations 
found in Experiment 1 A. The examined effects accounted for only 28% 
of the total variance, and it may be this high amount of variability 
which accounts for the inability to demonstrate the category switching 
effects when only two subjects were involved. 
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Because of this inability to replicate the results of the first 
experiment, the current findings do not provide clear evidence as to 
the effect of practice on the category switching effect. An experiment 
using a larger number of subjects is necessary to answer this 
question. 
When word stimuli were involved, three of the switching conditions 
show an increase in time per character on the second day of testing, as 
shown in Figure 5. A notable exception is the condition in which 
vehicles appear in both memory and perceptual lists. The behavior of 
this fourth switching condition differs from the pattern exhibited by 
the other three, for reasons which are not clear. 
The increase in performance time per character on the second day, 
coupled with decreases in the times for the memory and perception alone 
conditions, causes a large jump in switching time for word stimuli on 
day 2, as seen in Figure 6. There are a number of possible 
explanations for the increases seen in mean performance time for the 
three switching conditions. It could be that subjects were less 
motivated on the second day of testing. The sessions involved 45 
minutes of intense concentration. With such a task, a lull in 
concentration in the middle session would not be surprising. However, 
if this were the explanation, one might expect to see comparable 
increases in performance times for the alone conditions, which is not 
the case. 
Another explanation is that subjects experimented with various 
strategies on the second day of testing, in an attempt to make the 
switching task more manageable. After becoming acquainted with the 
task on the first day, subjects may have attempted to find ways to 
decrease the cognitive load imposed by the switching task. For 
example, subjects may have attempted to use various mnemonics to 
remember the items presented in the memory lists. Regardless of the 
explanation, in general it seems to take longer for subjects to show 
improvement with practice in the switching conditions as compared to 
the memory or perception alone conditions. 
Insert Figure 7 And 
Figure 8 About Here 
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The results for the character stimuli resemble the results of 
Experiment 1 A even less than do the word stimuli results. The 
non-significant differences between the two types of category switching 
are not evident in this experiment, as seen in Figures 7 and 8. Figure 
8 does show evidence of the memory load effect noted in the first 
experiment; switching conditions with letters held in memory take 
longer than those with numbers held in memory. 
The character stimuli also show an increase in switching time on 
the second day of testing. This result is consistent with that 
discussed earlier for word stimuli. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
The stimulus materials used in Experiment 1 differed in their 
category membership: character classes vs. word classes. In Experiment 
2, the stimulus materials differ on an analogic dimension, semantically 
referenced size. What effects on switching time, if any, occur when 
there is switching between words referencing similar or different 
sizes? There are a number of studies which suggest that physical 
properties such as size or length have an effect on processing rates. 
For example, Moyer (1973) asked subjects to judge the relative size of 
animals from memory. He found that such comparisons are of an analog 
nature; judgements involving animals which are more similar in size 
(such as a wolf and a lion) took longer than judgements involving 
animals which were less similar in size (such as a moose and a roach). 
Moyer found a size-distance effect in the sense that a fairly linear 
relationship exists between processing time and the logarithm of the 
estimated difference in animal size. 
This linear relationship seems to hold for a wide variety of 
stimuli and situations. Paivio (1975) demonstrated the same effect for 
a variety of stimuli other than animals. Johnson (1939) found the same 
relationship between processing time and similarity in perceptual 
comparisons of line lengths. This relationship is even present in the 
comparison of abstract qualities (Banks and Flora, 1977). 
One conclusion which can be drawn from these studies is that 
information concerning physical and abstract qualities of items held in 
memory is represented or modeled in the memory structures holding those 
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items. The way in which items are held in memory effects the 
processing of the items. One explanation for this size-distance effect 
is that some form of lateral inhibition of processing is occuring when 
closely related items are processed. It may be that the activation of 
one item inhibits the processing of other nearby items. 
An interesting question is whether the same sort of inhibitory 
effects are seen in switching attention between working memory and 
perception. The lateral inhibition and interference views of attention 
switching predict just such results: When switching between items which 
are similar and thus stored more closely, switching should take longer 
because of the inhibitory effect that the activation of one item has on 
nearby items. 
The spatial model of semantic memory and the spreading activation 
models predict exactly the opposite effect. According to these models, 
switching attention between less similar items should take longer. 
Experiment 2 examined the effect of the physical relatedness of 
items held in working memory and processed perceptually on the time 
required to switch attention between working memory and visual 
perception. Two lists of animals served as stimuli: a list of large 
animals and a list of small animals. 
There are three meaningful outcomes possible for this experiment: 
1) switching between animals of similar size may be faster than 
switching between animals of less similar size (a priming effect), 2) 
switching between animals of similar size could have taken longer than 
switching between animals of less similar size (a lateral inhibition or 
interference effect), or 3) the size manipulation may not have affected 
this type of attent~on switching because the information is available 
independently of the item's size. 
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If switches of attention between animals similar in size are 
executed faster than switches between animals less similar in size, it 
would suggest the existence of priming effects in within-category 
switching based on similarity in semantically referenced size. This. 
result would be consistent with items being stored in memory based on. 
their relative similarity, including size, to other items in memory. 
If attention switches between less physically similar items are 
executed more quickly than those between more physically similar items, 
support would be found for the lateral inhibition or interference model 
of attention switching. In the lateral inhibition view, if physically 
similar items are stored more closely than physically dissimilar items, 
and if the activation of an item inhibits the processing of nearby 
items, then one would predict longer switching times for more 
physically similar items. In interference terms, physically similar 
items may cause interference in working memory storage. 
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Experiment 2 A 
Method 
Subjects. Subjects were 20 undergraduates from psychology classes 
at Oklahoma State University, who received extra credit for their 
participation. The age range was from 18 to 25, and an equal number of 
male and female subjects participated. 
Stimuli. Two name lists of ten animals each were used in the 
experiment. The lists consisted of the ten largest and ten smallest 
mammals from a list of 176 items compiled by Paivio (1975), which were 
subject-rated for size. The two lists were as follows: 1) large 
animals (lion, horse, cow, camel, elk, bear, moose, giraffe, rhino, 
zebra), and 2) small animals (mouse, rat, squirrel, rabbit, skunk, cat, 
fox, beaver, raccoon, and monkey). 
Procedure. The experiment was a 2 X 4 within subjects design, 
involving two animal sizes (large and small), and four conditions 
(memory alone, perception alone, alternating within one animal size, 
and alternating between two different animal sizes. The eight types of 
trials are represented in Table 7. 
Insert Table 7 About Here 
Memory alone, Perception alone, and alternating trials progressed 
in the same fashion as described in Experiment 1. Each trial was 
scored for errors.as it was executed; the definition of an error 
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remained the same as in the first experiment. 
A sort task was undertaken to confirm that subjects could classify 
the animal stimuli as to size. Subjects were asked to arrange the 
animal names on cards from smallest to largest. All subjects placed 
the small animals in the first group of ten animals, and the large 
animals in the second group of ten animals. 
Results and Discussion. 
Figure 9 displays the switching time results for the within-size 
and between-size switching conditions. Figure 10 shows the mean 
performance times per item for all conditions. The results are 
clear-cut; the more disparate in size that items are, the longer it 
takes to execute a working memory-visual perception switch. A 2 X 2 X 
2 analysis of variance, involving two switching conditions (within-size 
and between-size), two animal sizes in memory (large and small), and 
two sexes, was performed on the calculated switching times. The 
analysis of variance indicated that the between-size and within-size 
.switching conditions are significantly different from one another, F 
(1,18) = 14.84, p<.0012. Table 8 summarizes the results of the 
switching time analysis. In addition, a 2 (animal sizes) X 2 (sexes) X 
4 (modes of presentation) analysis of variance was performed on the 
mean performance times for all conditions. A significant effect was 
found for mode of presentation, F (3,54) = 23.96, p~.0001. A 
Newman-Kuel's test revealed all comparisons between modes of 
presentation to be significant, C.diff = 48.3. Table 9 displays the 
analysis of the mean performance times. 
Insert Table 8, Table 9, 
And Table 10 About Here 
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As in the first experiment, the existence of a speed-tradeoff was 
tested for by calculating a correlation coefficient between the number 
of errors committed in each condition and the mean performance time for 
that condition. No significant negative correlations were observed, 
the type of correlation which one would expect if a speed-accuracy 
tradeoff existed. One positive correlation was found, in the 
perception alone conditon for large animals, indicating that when 
errors were made in this condition, mean performance time increased. 
The correlation coeficients are shown in Table 10. 
Insert Figure 9 And 
Figure 10 About Here 
The results shown in Figures 9 and 10 may be explained if size is 
a dimension which determines the location of items in memory storage. 
In this case, items more similar in size may be stored more closely 
together in semantic space. If attention travels through space in an 
analog fashion, as suggested by the spatial model of semantic 
attention, the travel time for attention would be less the more closely 
related in size the two items are. Thus, the results of this experiment 
are consistent with those of the first experiment. 
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A multi-dimensional scaling study by Rips, Shoben, and Smith 
(1973) using bird and mammal names as stimuli, seems to suggest that 
size may well be one of the dimensions by which items are organized in 
memory. The maps of conceptual space created by the procedure clearly 
show the items arranged by size on one axis, and by a ferocity 
dimension on the other axis. 
As in the first experiment, a spreading activation model would 
also account for the results. If items similar in size are stored more 
closely together in memory, activation may spread from initially 
presented items to other related items, allowing subsequent items to be 
accessed more easily. 
At first glance, the results of this experiment seem inconsistent 
with the results of mental size compasrison studies. These studies 
find a size disparity effect, such that the more similar in size two 
items are, the longer it takes for subjects to tell which is larger. 
However, the two situations are quite different. Kosslyn, Murphy, 
Bemesderfer, & Feinstien (1977) found that size comparisons of objects 
closely related in size often involve the generation of a mental image 
of the items in question. Such a step is time consuming, probably 
accounting for the size disparity effects found in mental size 
comparison studies, and is not necessary is switching attention between 
working memory and visual perception. Interestingly, Kosslyn et al. 
found that size comparisons of objects from different categories take 
longer than size comparisons of objects from the same category. This 
result is consistent with the findings of both Experiment 1 A and this 
experiment. 
As in the first experiment, no significant gender effects were 
observed. The observed effects accounted for .28 of the total 
variance. 
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Experiment 2 B 
As in the Experiment 1, the possibility exists that any switching 
effects found may be modified by practice. It is possible that the 
structure of memory may be changed by repeated attention switching 
between items such that subsequent attention switching between those 
items is accomplished more rapidly. In order to investigate this 
possibility, Experiment 2 B was conducted, involving repeated 
experimental sessions with two subjects. This experiment explores the 
effect of physical similarity on working memory-perceptual switching, 
when such a switch is well practiced. 
Method 
Subjects. Two subjects, graduate students from the psychology 
department at Oklahoma State University, were involved in the 
experiment. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2 A, 
except that the subjects were involved in three ~xperimental sessions 
held on consecutive days. 
Results and Discussion. 
As in Experiment 1 B, no statistical tests of significance were 
performed, because of the small number of subjects. The results of 
this experiment indicate that with practice, the differences between 
the various switching conditions become much smaller. 
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The switching time results are shown in Figure 11. On the first 
day of testing, the results are similar to those found in Experiment 2 
A, with between-size switching taking longer than within-size 
switching. The results. of the third day of testing show a difference 
of 58 msec between the fastest and slowest switching condition. 
The mean performance time per item results displayed in Figure 12 
show the same trend. On the first day of testing, large differences 
exist, especially when comparing the within-size alternating condition 
using large animal stimuli to the other three conditions. By the third 
day, all four switching conditions are within a 60 msec. range. 
Insert Figure 11 And 
Figure 12 About Here 
The results shown in Figures 11 and 12 may indicate that as 
subjects become more practiced, they are able to rearrange memory 
structures in such a way as to make the size variable less of a 
factor. Requiring one to switch between the same twenty items may 
eventually cause the storage of those items to be modified such that 
these items are stored more closely in semantic space. Another 
possiblity is that the links between the various items are 
"strengthened" by repeated switching, such that subsequent switching 
between those concepts is accomplished more quickly. 
Again, as in Experiment 1 B, one must be cautious about making 
conclusions based on two subjects. This is especially true in this 
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case, as a great deal of variability seems to be involved in the task. 
This paradigm seems particularly vulnerable to the effects of "noise" 
in practice effects studies. Excessive variability in either of the 
switching conditions, the perception alone conditions, or the memory 
alone conditions can cause large changes in the switching times for a 
particular subject. As discussed earlier, the most sensible control 
for this problem is the use of more subjects in such studies. 
Interestingly, three of the four switching conditions increased in 
switching time on the second day of testing. Figure 12 reveals that, 
unlike the results for switching conditions in Experiment 1 B, the mean 
performance times did not increase, but remained virtually the same for 
these three conditions. The increase in switching time occurs because-
the mean performance times for the memory and perception alone 
conditions show improvement on the second day, and when entered into 
the switching time formula, yield larger switching times. As in 
Experiment 1 B, the switching conditions generally take more practice 
to show improvement than do the various alone conditions. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Two experimental procedures were used to explore the effect of the 
relationship of stimuli involved in switching attention between working 
memory and visual perception. The major finding was that priming 
effects occur when word stimuli in working memory and visual perception 
are from the same semantic category. An important issue is the locus 
of the priming effect. Figure 13 represents the current task in the 
form of a hypothetical flow chart. 
Insert Figure 13 About Here 
One step in which priming is most likely to occur is the visual 
recognition process (step 3). Attention is concentrated on at least 
one of the memory items just prior to the execution of this step. If 
the memory items are from the same category as the items to be visually 
processed, the stage is set for some sort of priming. Of course, if the 
memory items are not from the same category, a priming effect would not 
be seen. 
In fact, a priming effect occuring in the processing of visually 
presented stimuli has already been found in a number of studies. 
Loftus (1973) asked subjects to produce a member of a category and a 
short time later produce a different member of the same category. 
Loftus found a 300 msec. facilitation effect when responses were 
preceded by other members of the same category. Meyer and Schvaneveldt 
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(1973) have also shown that it is easier to retrieve information from 
memory if related concepts have been accessed a short time previously. 
A second possible locus of priming effects is step 5, in which the 
subject finds the appropriate item held in working memory. This raises 
a question: Can an item already in working memory be primed, such that 
it is available more quickly for processing? It may be that once an 
item is at the threshold of activation which makes it available to 
working memory, additional activation only serves to maintain it at 
that threshold. However, it may also be the case that additional· 
activation allows the concept to be more easily retrieved and processed 
in working memory. 
The question of priming effects in working memory has implications 
for the structure of working memory. The existence of such effects 
would support the notion that working memory consists of concepts in 
long-term memory which have been raised in activation to a certain 
critical level. Views of working memory as a seperate buffer would not 
explain priming effects in working memory similar to those which occur 
in retrieving information from long-term memory. Further research 
involving attention switching may increase our understanding of the 
structure of working memory. 
The two models of priming presented in this study differ in their 
views of how facilitation occurs. The spatial model of semantic memory 
has an active explanation of priming in that the facilitation of 
retrieval is due to the action of the retrieval mechanism. This view 
is somewhat similar to the retrieval of data stored on magnetic tape. 
The focus of retrieval can only be directed at a single location at any 
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one time. It takes a finite amount of time to move that focus from one 
location to another, and the farther separated the items to be 
retrieved, the longer it takes to access the information. 
On the other hand, the mechanism for priming in spreading 
activation is more passive; it does not lie in the actual movement of 
the attention's focus through semantic space. Rather, priming is based 
on the conduction of activation along the links in the conceptual 
network, which raises the resting activation level of concepts. 
The two models are similar in that they both assume a network 
memory structure, such as that proposed by Anderson & Bower (1973). In 
such networks, concepts are represented as nodes which are linked 
together in various ways, depending on their relationship to one 
another. 
It is interesting to speculate on the possible practical 
applications of switching ability. Kahneman has demonstrated that 
tests of the ability to selectively attend to stimuli can be predictive 
of a number of practical skills (Gopher and Kahneman, 1971; Kahneman, 
Ben-Ishari, and Lotan, 1973). Kahneman and his associates, using a 
dichotic listening task, were able to predict with a fair degree of 
accuracy the flight performance of cadets in the Israeli Air Force and 
the accident rate of bus drivers. 
The test used in these studies was a dichotic listening task. The 
dependent variable obtained was errors committed. In contrast, the 
tasks used in the current study yields a direct estimate of the time 
required to switch attention. These task yield a measure which should 
be much more sensitive to individual differences. They may have 
promise as a measure of the efficiency of the human central processor 
and, as such, may have predictive ability for a wide range of 
activities. 
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Table 1 
Sixteen Trial Types Used in Experiment 1 A 
Trial Type 
Alone Trials 
Memory ~1ode 
Perception Mode 
Alternating Trials 
Within-Catgeory 
Between-Catgeory 
* 
Stimulus Class 
Characters 
Letters* 
*** 
*** 
Letters 
Letters 
Letters 
Letters 
Numbers 
Numbers 
*** 
*** 
Numbers 
Numbers 
Numbers 
Numbers 
Letters 
Words 
Clothing 
*** 
*** 
Clothing 
Clothing 
Clothing 
Clothing 
Vehicles 
Top list - memory, Bottom list - percpetion 
44 
Vehicles 
*** 
*** 
Vehicles 
Vehicles 
Vehicles 
Vehicles 
Clothing 
Table 2 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table. Experiment 1 A. 
Switching Time. 
Source df ~1S F 
Mode 1 265279.8 29.94 
Mode X Sex 1 11562.5 l. 31 
Subj (Sex) X Mode 18 8859.4 
Class 1 5342.1 .65 
Class X Sex 1 6635.3 .81 
Subj (Sex) X Class 18 8183.3 
Stim(Class) 2 74542.9 7.09 
Stim(Class) X Sex 2 13178.4 l. 25 
Subj (Sex) X Stim(Class) 36 10514.9 
Sex 1 97754.1 l. 92 
Subj (Sex) 18 50949.4 
Class X Mode 1 78623.8 11.39 
Class X Mode X Sex 1 1413.8 .20 
Subj (Sex) X Class X 
Mode 18 6902.2 
Stim(Class) X Mode 2 22094.8 5.07 
Subj (Sex) X Stim(Class) 
X Mode 36 10514.9 
45 
p F 
.0001 
.2683 
.4297 
.3798 
.0025 
.2977 
.1829 
.0034 
.6562 
.0115 
'T'able 3 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table. Experiment 1 A. 
Simple Effects Tests. Switching Time. 
Source 
Mode at Class 
Mode at Char 
Mode at Word 
Error 
Mode at Stirn 
Mode at Letter 
Mode at Number 
Mode at Clothing 
Mode at Vehicles 
Error 
Class at Mode 
Class at Between 
Class at Within 
Error 
Stirn at Mode 
Stirn at Between 
Stirn at Within 
Error 
df 
1 
1 
36 
1 
1 
1 
1 
54 
1 
1 
36 
2 
2 
72 
MS 
27531.2 
316372.4 
7880.8 
14121.1 
13414.7 
298511.3 
62046.2 
5858.2 
62477.3 
21488.6 
7542.7 
119914.3 
73361.1 
7436.3 
F 
3.49 
40.14 
2.41 
2.29 
50.96 
10.59 
8.28 
2.85 
16.1 
9.87 
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p F 
.10 
.01 
.25 
.25 
.01 
.01 
.01 
.10 
.01 
.01 
Table 4 
Experiment l A. Correlation Coefficients for Errors and 
Mean Performance Times. 
Trial Type 
Memory Alone 
Perception Alone 
Within-Catgeory 
Alternating 
Between-Category 
Alternating 
* 
Words 
Clothing 
-.10 
• 6 8 
-.03 
• 89 
.09 
.71 
.01 
.96 
* 
Stimulus Class 
Characters 
Vehicles 
.31 
.17 
-.06 
• 80 
.40 
.08 
-.18 
.46 
Letters 
-.29 
.21 
.06 
.80 
-.04 
.86 
.01 
.97 
Numbers 
.07 
.78 
.38 
.09 
-.14 
.55 
-.13 
.59 
47 
Top number- Correlation Coefficient, Bottom number- Level 
of Significance. 
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Table 5 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table. Experiment 1 A. 
Mean Performance Times. 
Source df MS F p F 
Mode 3 12714062 30.87 .0001 
Mode X Sex 3 541312 1. 31 .278 
Subj (Sex) X Mode 54 41180 7 
Class 1 25362627 94.92 .0001 
Class X Sex 1 178085 .67 .4249 
Subj (Sex) X Class 18 267191 
Stim(Class) 2 793161 7.97 . 0014 
Stim(Class) X Sex 2 54936 .55 .5805. 
Subj (Sex) X Stim(Class) 36 99506 
Sex 1 1137 0 .99 
Subj (Sex) 18 7546871 
Class X Mode 3 712663 5.07 .0038 
Class X Mode X Sex 3 . 44535 .32 .8149 
Subj (Sex) X Class 
X Mode 108 140563 
Stim(Class) X Mode 6 613811 4.39 .0005 
Stim(Class) X Mode X Sex 6 123875 . 89 .5072 
Subj (Sex) X Stirn (Class) 
X Mode 108 139673 
Table 6 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table. Simple Effects Tests. 
Experiment 1 A. Mean Performance Time. 
Source df MS F p F 
---=---·- ---
Mode at Class 
Mode at Char 3 14384104 52.08 .01 
Mode at Word 3 25896071 93.76 .01 
Error 108 276185 
Mode at Stirn 
Mode at Letters 3 12372258 53.7 .01 
Mode at Numbers 3 3586357 15.57 .01 
Mode at Clothing 3 18661247 81 .01 
Mode at Vehicles 3 9343182 40.55 .01 
Error 162 230384 
Class at Mode 
Class at Memory 1 4661542 27.07 .01 
Class at Perception 1 6857379 39.82 .01 
Class at Within 1 2742039 15.92 .01 
Class at Between 1 13239654 76.88 .01 
Error 72 172219 
Stirn at Mode 
Stirn at Memory 2 173243 1. 34 • 5 
Stirn at Perception 2 186428 1. 43 .25 
Stirn at Within 2 1829748 14.12 .01 
Stirn at Between 2 30 79 770 23.76 .01 
Error 144 129631 
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Table 7 
Eight Trial Types Used in Experiment 2 A 
Trial Type 
Memory Mode 
Perception Mode 
Within-Size 
Alternating 
Between-Size 
Alternating 
* 
* Large 
*** 
*** 
Large 
Large 
Large 
Large 
Small 
Animal Size 
Small 
*** 
*** 
Small 
Small 
Small 
Small 
Large 
Top list - memory, Bottom list - perception 
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Table 8 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table. Experiment 2 A. 
Switching Time. 
Source df HS F 
Mode 1 128304.7 15.12 
Mode X Sex 1 4059.2 .48 
Subj (Sex) X Mode 18 8484.6 
Stirn 1 92.6 .01 
Stirn X Sex 1 3562 .33 
Subj (Sex) X Stirn 18 10866.9 
Sex 1 193560.8 3.08 
Subj (Sex) 18 62898.7 
Mode X Stirn 1 1328.3 .21 
Node X Stirn X Sex 1 20003.1 3.12 
Subj (Sex) X Mode X Stirn 18 6404 
51 
p F 
.0011 
.4980 
.9275 
.5741 
.0964 
.6542 
.0941 
Table 9 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table. Experiment 2 A. 
Mean Performance Time. 
Source df MS F 
Mode 3 9853014 23.96 
Mode X Sex 3 876548 2.13 
Subj (Sex) X Mode 54 411270 
Sex 1 1795481 .57 
Subj (Sex) 18 3177051 
Stirn 1 128451 .85 
Stirn X Sex 1 167043 1.11 
Subj (Sex) X Stirn 18 150853 
Mode X Stirn 3 9646 .08 
Mode X Stirn X Sex 3 103348 .85 
Subj (Sex) X Mode X Stirn 54 121392 
52 
p F 
.0001 
.1055 
.4619 
.3683 
.3066 
.9656 
.4743 
Table 10 
Experiment 2 A. Correlation Coefficients for Errors 
and Mean Performance Times. 
Trial Type 
Memory Mode 
Perception Mode 
Within-Size 
Alternating 
Between-Size 
Alternating 
* 
Small 
-.18 
.44 
.07 
.77 
.21 
.38 
.02 
.93 
* 
Animal Size 
Large 
.27 
.25 
.53 
.01 
.20 
.39 
-.08 
.74 
53 
Top number - Correlation Coefficient, Bottom Number - Level 
of Significance. 
Figure Caption 
Figure l· The spatial model of semantic memory as it relates to 
switching within category and between categories. Attention has more 
distance to travel when switching between categories. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure ~· The lateral inhibition model in regard to within-category and 
between-category switching. Activation of a concept inhibits processing 
of nearby concepts, slowing within-category switching. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 2· Experiment 1 A. Switching times for within-category and 
between-category switching conditions. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 4. Experiment 1 A. Mean performance times per item for memory, 
perception, within-category alternating, and between-category 
alternating conditions. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure i· Experiment 1 B. Switching times for within and between 
category switching conditions using word stimuli, measured across three 
sessions. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure ~· Experiment 1 B. Switching times for within category and 
between category switching conditions using character stimuli, measured 
across three sessions. 
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Figure Z· Experiment 1 B. Mean performance times per item for 
conditions using word stimuli, measured across three sessions. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure ~· Experiment 1 B. Mean performance times per item for 
conditions using character stimuli, measured across three sessions. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure ~· Experiment 2 A. Switching times for within size and between 
size switching conditions. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure lQ· Experiment 2 A. Mean performance times per item for memory 
mode, perception mode, and alternating modes. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure l!· Experiment 2 B. Switching times for within size and between 
size switching conditions, measured across three sessions. 
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Figure 12. Experiment 2 B. Mean performance times per character for 
memory mode, perception mode, and alternating modes, measured across 
three sessions. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 12· Hypothetical flow chart of the steps involved in the working 
memory-visual perception switching task. 
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Historical Overview of Attention Theory 
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief historical 
overview of attentional theory, and in particular, to refer to the 
developments of attention theory which relate to attention switching. 
This is to provide a background for the discussion of various 
experimental paradigms used to study the time it takes to switch 
attention. 
Posner (1982) states that attentional theory has shown a 
cumulative development over the last 100 years. This cumulative 
development is evident in that many of the basic assumptions used in 
the study of attention switching come from the empirical findings of 
past researchers. 
For example, Helmholtz (1852) discovered that mental operations 
are slow enough to allow study, when he demonstrated that the rate of 
nerve conduction is only around 100 meters per second. Wundt (1912) 
found that two mental events occuring closely in time are handled in a 
successive manner. Wundt's findings provide a basis for study of 
attention switching in two respects: They suggest that attentional 
capacity is of a limited nature, and that when two operations are 
undertaken which overload this capacity, these operations are often 
performed successively. Welch (1898) added the idea that the 
interference produced on one task by another concurrent task could be 
used to study the common capacity required by the two tasks. This idea 
has been used in the study of attention shifts, especially in dichotic 
81 
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listening tasks. 
Danders (1869) devised a scheme for studying the time it takes 
various stages of mental processes to be performed. Danders assumed 
that mental processes are organized into a series of stages. he 
attempted to measure the length of a processing stage by his 
subtractive technique. Danders constructed tasks which differed in 
that one of the tasks contained an extra stage of processing. By 
subtracting the processing time of the task without the extra stage of 
processing from the task containg that stage, Danders believed that the 
time required to complete that stage of processing could be measured. 
Although the subtractive method had several flaws, such as the 
assumption of strict serial processing, and the fact that inserting a 
processing stage may alter the entire structure of the task (Woodworth, 
1938), Danders' attempt to study the time taken by various mental acts 
was an important step in the development of attentional theory. 
Although the groundwork for the study of attention switching had 
been laid prior to 1920, attention theory was essentially dormant until 
the 1950's. During this period, behaviorism dominated psychology, and 
the emphasis on stimulus-response laws and the prohibition against 
studying unobservable components of behavior did not allow for the 
exploration of internal cognitve processes. According to Chase (1978), 
part of the reason for the decline of behaviorism was its inability to 
account for findings concerning the limits of human performance. New 
ideas were required to explain selective attention, limited attentional 
capacity, and attention switching. 
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Posner (1982) states that another important event in the 
development of-attentional theory was the generation of a language by 
which the ideas of early researchers could be brought together into a 
systematic analysis of attention. This general language has been 
called information processing, and it developed from advances in 
telephone engineering and computers. According to Posner, the language 
of information processing provides a vehicle for the discussion of 
computational operations at every level of the system, from processing 
a series of letters into a meaning to the processes occuring at 
individual synapses. 
In the 1950's, with the decline of behaviorism and the development 
of information processing concepts, the stage was set for the 
development of attention theories. Broadbent (1958) proposed one the 
first models of attention, based largely on an information-processing 
analysis of dichotic listening tasks. Dichotic listening involves the 
simultaneous presentation of different stimuli to the two ears (a 
discussion of the dichotic listening paradigm in relation to attention 
switching is presented in the next section). The experiments conducted 
by Broadbent and others (Cherry, 1953; Cherry & Taylor, 1954) showed 
that individuals are limited in their ability to process information. 
To account for these limitations, Broadbent proposed a filter model. 
Broadbent theorized that humans have a limited capacity perceptual 
channel, and can accept input from only one source at a time. The 
input channels leading into the single perceptual channel were selected 
between by means of a switch. This switch is located at the 
"bottleneck" formed by the junction of sensory input channels, and thus 
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theories of this type have been referred to as bottleneck theories. 
In terms of attention switching, Broadbent's filter model was 
quite limited. According to this model, attention switching occurred 
only at the junction of sensory input channels. Thus, attention could 
only be switched between those various input channels. 
Broadbent's-filter model could not explain some of the 
experimental effects being found in dichotic listening research. For 
example, Moray (1959) found that subjects would often hear their own 
names on the channel they were not attending to. In addition, Triesman 
(1960) found that if a meaningful message alternated back and forth 
between the ears, subjects often followed the meaningful message rather 
than attending to a single ear as they had been instructed. To account 
for the new data, Triesman proposed an attentuation model (Triesman, 
1960). This model was also a bottleneck theory, but with the 
bottleneck placed at the pattern recognition stage, rather than the 
sensory input stage. Triesman proposed a filter which did not block 
out competing stimuli, but merely attentuated it, making it less likely 
to be heard. Messages from unattended channels did get through, and 
would be recognized if the recognition threshold for the particular 
message was exceeded. Each concept was assumed to have a different 
threshold, depending on its permanent threshold level (one's own name 
would be assumed to have a permanently low threshold), and temporary 
lowering of a threshold based on the listener's expectations. 
The model proposed by Deutsch & Deutsch (1963), and 
elaborated by Norman (1968) places the bottleneck a later stage of 
processing, after perception has already occurred. Most stimuli are 
perceived, but many are quickly forgotten. Selection is based on the 
strength and the importance of the processed stimuli. 
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In terms of attention switching, Trieman's attentuation model and 
the Deustch-Norman model provided somewhat more flexibility to the 
switching mechanism than did Broadbent's filter model. Although 
switches of attention were still assumed to be solely between input 
channels, the basis for the attention selection process was expanded in 
these theories. Attention could be switched based on the semantic 
properties of the stimuli, instead of basing the attention switch 
simply on what channel was to be attended to. 
A new conceptualization of the attention process was provided by 
Moray (1967). Moray likened the attention mechanism to a limited 
capacity processor of information. Earlier viewpoints, such as those 
of Broadbent, Triesman, and Norman, had pictured attention as a limited 
capacity channel. The distinction between these two views had a great 
effect on the type of attention theories proposed. The limited 
capacity channel view is the underlying conceptualization in bottleneck 
theories; at some point, the information processing system narrows, so 
that only a small amount of information can be processed at any one 
time. 
One difficulty with this view of attention was discovering the 
location of the bottleneck. Some data seemed to suggest that the 
bottleneck occurred during perception (Broadbent, 1958; Triesman, 
1971), while other data seemed to suggest that it occurred after 
perception (Lewis, 1970; MacKay, 1973; Corteen & Wood, 1972). 
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In contrast, attention as viewed as a limited capacity processor 
inplies that the capacity of attention can be allocated in a number of 
different ways, depending on the demands of the task. The individual 
can flexibly alter his or her internal self-programming to handle tasks 
in a variety of ways. Thus, the question of where the bottleneck 
occurs is no longer relevent; the individual may have the ability to 
place the bottleneck caused by limited capacity at whatever stage of 
processing is most compatible to the task at hand. Theories of 
attention which emphasize the allocation of the limited capacity of the 
central processor are referred to as capacity theories. 
Johnston & Heinz (1978) proposed a variation on bottleneck 
theories which also contained the flexibility of capacity theories. 
They theorize that the individual has control over where the bottleneck 
in attention will occur. The later in processing selection of input to 
be attended to occurs, the more the capacity required. 
Kahneman (1973) proposed a capacity model of attention. which 
assumed that the individual has a great deal of control over how the 
limited capacity of attention is allocated. Which activities are given 
capacity depends on the goals of the individual and whether or not the 
activity is one which involutarily demands attention. An interesting 
assumption of this theory is that processing capacity changes with the 
level of arousal. Capacity follows the inverted "u" shaped curve 
defined by the Yerkes-Dodson law; moderate levels of arousal yield the 
largest attentional capacity. 
Capacity theories of attention assume a much more flexible role 
for the attention switching process. Since capacity can be flexibly 
altered to suit the demands of the situation, switching may take more 
or less capacity. It may be that concurrent tasks or other types of 
memory load have some effect on attention switching, if the switching 
process is subsequently allocated less capacity. The speed at which 
attention is switched may depend on the capacity demands of the 
situation. 
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Paradigms Used To Study Attention Switching 
The following section describes the various types of experimental 
paradigms used to study the time it takes to switch attention. Results 
of studies using the various paradigms will be described, and 
advantages and disadvantages of each paradigm will be discussed. 
The Dichotic Listening Paradigm- One of the earliest and most used 
schemes for studying selective attention in general, and switching 
processes in particular, was the dichotic listening, or shadowing 
paradigm. These familiar studies involved subjects listening to two 
distinct channels of information presented to the ears at various rates 
and in various sequences. Sometimes, the subjects were instructed to 
"shadow", or subvocally repeat, the items presented on one channel. 
Typically, however, in experiments studying switching time, the 
subjects were instructed to try to retain as much information from the 
two channels as possible. Since the subjects were attempting to 
monitor two channels of information at once, it was assumed that 
subjects would have to switch back and forth between the channels. The 
dependent variable typically used in such switching experiments was the 
percentage of items correctly recalled. The use of this dependent 
measure makes it difficult, but not impossible, to make inferences 
about the attention switching process; it is hard to draw conclusions 
about switching time from this paradigm, since no measure of that time 
is directly assessable through the task. 
It was dichotic listening tasks that first started speculation 
that switching attention may take a finite ammount of time. Two series 
of experiments conducted in the early 1950's suggested the existence of 
switching time. Broadbent, a pioneer in attention theory, explored 
factors which influence item recall of simultaneous presentations to 
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the two ears (Broadbent, 1954, 1956c, 1957a). Broadbent (1954) found 
that recall is a more natural (and effective) process in a dichotic 
situation when subjects recalled items which were presented to one ear, 
then recalled items presented to the other ear. This single ear 
strategy was much easier, even though it meant recalling some items out 
of temporal sequence. It was as though items were stored according to 
which ear they entered, and that switching attention between these two 
stores took more effort than simply recalling the all the items 
presented to one ear, then recalling all the items presented to the 
other. Broadbent postulated that two factors may account for this type 
of result: 1) subjects are unable to perceive the dichotically 
presented items simultaneously, and 2) subjects have difficulty rapidly 
switching attention back and forth between the ears. 
The second early study which suggested the existence of switching 
time was conducted by Cherry & Taylor (1954). They alternated a single 
speech message between the ears at varying rates using an electronic 
switch. They found that intelligibility of the speech message dropped 
sharply at about 2.5 hz switching rate. One possible explanation was 
that this rate represented the point at which the attention switching 
mechanism could no longer keep up with the switches of the message. 
A number of studies extended the findings of the early dichotic 
listening experiments beyond audition. Broadbent (1954c) found similar 
effects in switching between the eyes and ears. In addition, Sampson 
(1964) found that switching attention between the eyes (a very 
unnatural situation) seemed to involve some cost in terms of items 
recalled. It was concluded that attention switching could be 
responsible for such a loss of information. 
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Later experiments cast doubt on these early results, and 
questioned whether attention switching accounted for the drop in 
intelligibility when one was forced to rapidly switch attentional 
channels to follow a message (Moray, 1960; Savin, 1967). Savin, for 
example, found that subjects still prefer to group successive classes 
of items rather than simultaneously presented items of different 
classes, even when such items were presented to the same ear. It may 
be, however, that attention switching of a different sort, between 
classes of items, may have accounted for these results. If subjects 
were required to listen to two seperate classes of inputs, it may take 
time to switch attention between the two classes, making successive 
recall of each class a less effortful and more natural operation. 
Broadbent continued his explorations of phenomena suggesting the 
existence of a finite switching time. Broadbent & Gregory (1961) found 
that having subjects switch sensory modalities in an alternation task 
makes that task more difficult. In alternating recall of items between 
vision and hearing, subjects recalled items more poorly than when 
recalling them grouped by vision or hearing. This deficit occ~rred 
even when item presentation was not simultaneous, suggesting that the 
cross-modality switching process may be more time consuming than 
switching within the same modality. 
Triesman (1971) performed a series of experiments which strongly 
suggested the existence of a finite switching time in attention. She 
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found that the recall of digits presented alternately to the ears was 
more difficult than successive presentation to one ear and then the 
other. The difficulty in recall increased as the item presentation 
rate became more rapid, which is exactly what would be expected if 
attention switching were causing the drop in items recalled. Triesman 
concluded that since presentation rate effected the recall of items, 
the difficulties in recalling items were located in the selection of 
input items to be attended to. She framed her results in terms of an 
attentuation model, stating that input from one channel (or even one 
type of attribute) may be attentuated or inhibited while the other 
occupies the capacity of the processor. This selective attentuator 
must be reset, which takes time, hence, brings about switching time. 
Meanwhile, other investigators using the dichotic listening 
paradigm were expanding our understanding of attentional processes. 
Attention was beginning to be seen as a more complex process than had 
earlier been invisioned. Studies examining different types or classes 
of inputs brought about an understanding that attention switching 
involved more than the simple selection of an input channel. The 
characteristics of inputs could be selectively attended to and switched 
between. 
Several dichotic listening experiments found effects when subjects 
were required to attend to different classes of stimuli. Gray & 
Wedderburn (1966) found that simulus class effects the ease with which 
items are recalled. Broadbent & Gregory (1964) found that a reduction 
in presentation rate from that used in Gray & Wedderburn produced a 
much greater improvement in performance when the items were of two 
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alternated classes. It was suggested that the slowed presentation rate 
provided the subjects with time to switch attention between item type. 
These studies suggested that the attention process has a great 
deal of flexibility in terms of what is to be attended to or switched 
between. Attention can be allocated to a number of sensory channels 
(between the ears, for example), but it can also be allocated to any 
number of attributes of a stimulus. Individuals can attend to the 
color, shape, texture, or other qualities of stimuli, and are seemingly 
oblivious to most other non-attended qualities (Rock & Gutman, 1981). 
The experiments in dichotic listening seemed to suggest the cen~ral 
processor is flexibly self-programmed to adapt to the situation at hand 
(Moray, 1967). 
Some novel innovations have been introduced to study attention 
switching using the dichotic listening paradigm. One such innovation 
is the use of alternating clicks (rather than meaningful stimuli), with 
the subject's task being to estimate the number of clicks presented 
(Axelrod & Guzy, 1972~ Axelrod & Powazek, 1972~ Hoopen & Voos, 1981). 
The click estimates provided a more exact measure of the information 
being lost during attention switches. Axelrod & Guzy (1968) found that 
when the clicks are alternated from ear to ear, the subjects 
significantly underestimated the number of clicks presented. Hoopen & 
Voos (1981) argued that this early study was flawed in that the number 
of clicks to be counted and the nuffiber of switches performed were both 
systematically varied at once. After altering the paradigm to allow 
independence of these factors, Hoopen & Voos concluded that attention 
switching is time-consuming and performance-limiting. 
93 
Dichotic listening tasks have also been used to search for 
developmental differences in the attention switching process. For 
example, Hiscock & Kinsbourne (1980) have found a developmental 
increase in switching efficiency. They also noted a significant right 
ear advantage in dichotic listening tasks, when seperately analyzing 
the data presented to each ear. 
Although dichotic listening experiments were the first to study 
switching effects, and easily account for the majority of attention 
switching experiments conducted, the paradigm presents some serious 
drawbacks to those wishing to study attention switching. 
First of all, dichotic listening is a task involving two distinct 
input channels: the two ears. This has advantages in that it is easy 
to provide seperate inputs to each channel. However, the results of 
such experiments lack generalizability to all switching situations. It 
is a very rare occurence in the real world for an individual to receive 
two distinct, seperate inputs to the ears. The task is modeled after 
the notion of attention switching as a process of selecting from 
predefined input channels. However, attention has been found to be far 
more flexible than this; attention switches can be made on the basis of 
stimulus characteristics within the same input channel. Dichotic 
listening, which is inherently a two-channel task, is not well-suited 
to study the complex attention switching situations which the limited 
capacity processor is capable of. 
For example, one question of interest is the time required to 
switch between differing outputs. This occurs in speaking or singing, 
when one switches the pitch or volume of one's voice. The dichotic 
listening paradigm is not equipped to study such a situation. The 
limited range of switching activities which can be studied using this 
paradigm is a serious drawback to its use in studying attention 
switching. 
94 
Dichotic listening tasks use error rates as the primary dependent 
variable. Thus, no direct measure of the time it takes to switch 
attention is available through the use of this paradigm. Switching 
time is inferred based on the stimulus presentation rate that begins to 
elicit a large number of errors. Criteria for what constitutes an 
adequate number of errors to infer that the rate of the stimuli 
shifting between the ears has overtaken the speed of the attention 
switching mechanism is strictly arbitrary. The lack of a direct 
empirical estimate of switching time is probably the most serious 
disadvantage to using the dichotic listening paradigm to study 
attention switching. 
In addition, dichotic listening tasks do not provide subject 
self-pacing of attention switching. In the real world, it is the 
individual who determines the rate of attention switching. In dichotic 
listening, the experimenter must specify stimulus presentation rates, 
then infer switching time based on the errors which occur at each 
presentation rate. It would be advantageous if the subject could 
determine the rate of switching. Subject self-pacing provides an 
estimate of the switching time which is comfortable and efficient for 
the individual, and which is more congruent with the type of attention 
switches which occur in everyday life. 
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Expectancy or Response Set Paradigm- The second type of paradigm used 
to study the time required to switch attention is the expectancy or 
response set paradigm. This type of experiment has often been used to 
study switching attention from one sensory modality to another, 
although it is an approach capable of studying many attention switching 
situations. This approach involves having subjects expect to attend to 
a certain type of stimulus attribute, then require a response to be 
made to a differing stimulus attribute. The stimulus attributes may 
involve the sensory modality attended to, the type of stimulus attended 
to, or the particular aspect of a stimulus attended to. The time 
required to execute a response to an unanticipated stimulus attribute 
is typically longer than when the subject is responding to an expected 
stimulus attribute. Subtracting the mean reaction time to an expected 
attribute from the mean reaction time to an unexpected attribute yields 
an index of the time required to switch attention from one attribute to 
another. 
The subject's expectancy that a certain attribute or modality will 
be attended to is typically created in one of three ways. First, cues 
may be provided to the subject before each trial instructing the 
subject to attend to a particular stimulus aspect or sensory modality. 
Second, numerous trials involving attention to an attribute or modality 
may proceed a switching trial, so that the subject believes the 
liklihood is great that the insuing trial will require attention to 
that attribute or modality. Third, some studies assume that a single 
trial primes the subject to attend to the type of stimulus presented in 
that trial. This assumption may not hold in many switching situations, 
and this particular method is not commonly used. 
Wundt (1893) was interested in the effect of. expectancy on the 
ability of subjects to attend to various stimuli. He states the 
following: 
Slighter but still very noticeable is the retardation 
(in quickness of response) if one arranges the 
experiment to have the observer in ignorance as 
to whether light, sound, or touch impression will 
be forthcoming, so that the attention cannot be 
turned to a particular sense organ. Immediately one 
notes a peculiar unrest because the strain of attention 
continously vacilates among the several senses. 
Wundt seems far ahead of his time in his observations of _the limited 
capacity of attention. 
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Kristofferson (1965,1967) was one of the first researchers to use the 
expectancy approach to study attention switching. Kristofferson (1965) 
was interested in what he referred to as minimum dwell time. This was the 
minimum amount of time that one must attend tb a particular stimulus after 
directing attention to it and before attention can be switched to a 
different stimulus. Kristofferson presented subjects with two stimuli 
simultaneously, a tone and a light. The subjects' task is to indicate 
when one of the stimuli ceased. At times, subjects were cued as to which 
stimulus to attend to, and at times no cue was provided. Kristofferson 
found a minimum dwell time of about 60 msec. However, his method does not 
adequately divide minimum dwell time from the time required to switch 
attention. Kristofferson assumed that the actual switching time was 
minimal, an assumption Moray called "perhaps the biggest conceptual 
weakness of his scheme" (Moray,1969). 
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Kristofferson attempted to tie the conception of a "psychophysical 
time quantum" to attention switching, using his expectancy studies as the 
basis of his theorizing (Kristofferson, 1967). He suggested that the data 
processing operations of the nervous system were governed by a "clock" 
similar to those found in computers. The clock would generate a succesion 
of equally spaced points in time. These points in time would occur at a 
rate of about one every 50 msec. Kristofferson believed that these points 
determined when it was possible (but not necessary) to switch attention 
from one stimuli to another, and determined when information may be passed 
from one processing stage to another. Kristofferson's views are 
fascinating, but are based on his research involving minimum dwell time, 
research which seems to confound minimum dwell time and switching time. 
One of the best examples of experiments using the expectancy approach 
to study switching time is that of LaBerge (1973). LaBerge had subjects 
perform detection or discrimination tasks using two different stimuli in 
two sensory modalities, vision and hearing. Using two types of tasks was 
assumed to be a "depth of processing" manipulation, as deeper processing 
was to occur in a discrimination between two stimuli than in the detection 
of a single stimuli. LaBerge used trials involving either discrimination 
or detection to set the subjects' expectancy as to which sensory modality 
to attend to. He found that the depth of processing involved effected 
both the time required to switch from the modality attended to and the 
time required to switch into the next modality. LaBerge's results 
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suggested the existence of at least two factors involved in switching 
time: 1) the time required to exit a particular attentional state, and 2) 
the time required to enter a different attentional state. 
Proctor & Fiscaro (1977) provide an example of the use of blocks of 
trials to create an expectancy for subjects to attend to a particular type 
of stimulus characteristic. They had subjects classify stimuli as being 
the same or different on one of three perceptual attributes (color, size, 
or form). In one condition, the subjects saw blocks in which the 
discrimination always involved attending to one attribute. In another 
condition, the stimulus attributes that the subjects were to attended to 
varied from trial to trial. Raection times were longer in the varied 
attribute condition. Proctor & Fiscaro concluded that time and central 
processing capacity are required to select between perceptual attributes. 
Boulter (1977) has also found lengthened reaction times with visual, 
auditory, and tactile stimuli when the modality of the presented signal 
was uncertain. Similar uncertainty effects have even been found involving 
attending to differing spatial frequencies (Davis, 1981). 
This particular class of experiments has proven to be very flexible 
in the studying of various aspects of attention switching. For example, 
Klein (1977) has used expectancy created by cueing to demonstrate a bias 
to attend to visual stimuli. Shulman, Remington, & McLean (1978), in an 
ingenious application of this paradigm, used cues to have subjects shift 
attention in the visual field while the eyes remained fixated on a central 
point. They discovered that attention can be moved in an analog fashion 
across the visual field independent of eye movements. 
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Cross-modality switching has been studied in psychiatric patients 
suffering from schizophrenia by using an expectancy approach. Mettler 
(1955) suggested that schizophrenics may have difficulties switching 
attention across sensory modalities. A number of studies have been 
performed comparing the switching efficiency of normals and schizophrenics 
(Sutton, Hakerem, Zubin, & Portnoy, 1961~ Kristofferson, 1967~ 
Davies-Osterkamp, Rist, & Bangert, 1977). The results of these studies 
all suggest that schizophrenics have much more difficulty switching 
attention between the senses than normals. 
The expectancy paradigm has a number of advantages. First, it is 
quite flexible~ a wide variety of attention switching situations can be 
studied using this method. This type of experimentation has certainly 
proven to be capable of studying many attention switching situations which 
could not be examined using a dichotic listening paradigm. 
A second major advantage is that the primary dependent variable 
obtained using this paradigm is reaction time. It is possible, by 
comparing the performance of subjects in conditions requiring attention 
switching to subjects in conditions not requiring switches of attention, 
to estimate switching time. In comparison to dichotic listening tasks, 
the expectancy approach yields a more exact estimate of the time required 
to switch attention. 
The expectancy paradigm also has a number of disadvantages. The 
paradigm typically requires subjects to perform some sort of 
discrimination task in addition to making switches of attention. This 
added task must take up some of the capacity of the central processor. 
The addition of another task may bring a.bout an increase in switching 
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time. Weber, Byrd, & Noll (1984) have found that increasing memory load 
greatly lengthens the time required to switch attention between working 
memory and visual perception. Because of the additional task required in 
expectancy experiments, the estimate of switching time obtained through 
use of this paradigm may be somewhat inflated. 
In addition, the paradigm does not measure the time it takes to 
alternate between tasks requiring different attentional states. The 
expectancy approach simply misdirects the subjects' expectations, and 
measures the additional reaction time brought about by the misdirection. 
It may be that anticipating a response to a particular stimulus attribute 
does not require the same depth of processing as actually having to make 
such a response. LaBerge (1977) has demonstrated a depth of processing 
effect for attention switching; the more deeply processing occurs, the 
more time consuming a subsequent attention switch is. Thus, this paradigm 
may not yield as accurate an estimate of switching time as might be 
desired. 
The Attention Switching Time Paradigm- The switching time paradigm 
involves measuring the time required to alternate between two tasks which 
involve attending to different stimulus attributes, input channels, output 
parameters, or output modalities. The times required to do each task 
seperately is also measured. The mean times required to do each task 
seperately, and the mean time required to alternate between tasks is 
placed into a switching time formula. The formula is as follows: 
SWITCHING TIME= (ALT- (A+ B))/# OF SWITCHES 
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where ALT = the time required to alternate between tasks, A = the time 
required to complete the first task alone, and B = the time required to do 
the second task alone. This formula yields an estimate of the average 
time required to execute a single attention switch. 
A study conducted by Jersild (1927) seemed to anticipate this 
paradigm. Jersild did not use a switching time formula, but did compare 
the times required to execute a task involving a "shift of mental set" to 
the times required to do comparable tasks which did not require this 
shift. 
Jersild measured the time required to alternately subtract three from 
a two digit number and give a common opposite of a word in a mixed list of 
words and numbers. He compared this time to the time required to perform 
each operation seperately on pure lists of numbers and words. He found 
surprisingly that it takes less·time to accomplish the alternation task. 
Spector & Biederman (1976) replicated Jersild's results. They 
explained that this effect seemed to occur because the class of stimuli 
provided the subjects with a cue as to the type of operation required. 
When Spector & Biederman constructed a task in which the type of operation 
required was not unambiguously cued by the type of stimuli used, a large 
shift loss (increase in switching time) was found. 
Weber and his collegues have begun an extensive research program 
using the switching time paradigm. This research is designed to study 
various operations performed by the human operating system. The human 
operating system is analogous to the basic input/output systems found in 
computers; it is the underlying mechanism which allows us to select 
between various types of inputs and outputs, just as the computer 
operating system selects between inputs and ouputs. Although such an 
operating system seems logically necessary, it has been only marginally 
studied. In fact, artificial intelligence theories, which attempt to 
create computer simulations of. human information processing, do not 
generally discuss control systems (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, 1982). 
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Much of the research already completed deals with switching between 
various output parameters. Weber, Blagowsky, & Mankin (1982) examined the 
switching time involved in alternating between various vocal output 
intensities. Two models of response intensity representation were 
suggested: 1) an analog model, in which the response intensity is 
represented by a pointer moving along an internal intensity continuum, and 
2) a symbolic model, in which various parameters are substituted into the 
"formula" which determines response intensity. The results supported the 
symbolic model of response representation. It took no longer to switch 
from a low intensity vocalization to a yell than from a medium intensity 
vocalization to a yell. 
Mankin (1983) studied magnitude switching effects in handwriting and 
in mental image generation. He found results suggesting that handwriting 
size may be represented in a symbolic manner, while image size seems to 
involve an analogic representation, with it taking longer to switch 
greater distances on an image-size continuum. 
There are a number of other studies currently underway examining 
switching between various types of outputs. Weber & Brown (1984) are 
examining alternating between playing music and singing. Weber & Gowdy 
(1984) are looking at the time require to switch between vocal pitches. 
Preliminary results suggest that alternating between playing music and 
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singing involves a considerable switching time, but that switching time 
between various vocal pitch outputs is very small, and in one case a 
negative switching time has been found. A negative switching time 
indicates that the time required to complete an alternating task is faster 
on the average than the times required to do the alone or non-alternating 
conditions. Such a result could occur either because of random variation 
(the alone and alternating conditions are assessed on different trials) or 
because of a refractory period for some of the processes in the alone 
conditions. 
Studies have also been done examining switching between inputs. 
Weber, Noll, & Byrd (1984) are currently examining the time required to 
switch between working memory and visual perception. In the first 
experiment, a switching time of about 293 msec was found for such an 
attention switch, using letters as stimuli. In the second experiment, it 
was found that as working memory load increases, the time required to make 
a working memory-visual perception switch also increases. 
The switching time paradigm has a number of advantages in comparison 
to other approaches. The dependent variable is a direct measure of the 
time required to switch attention. In addition, concurrent tasks, such as 
the discrimination tasks used in expectancy studies, are not necessary 
using this approach. 
The paradigm is widely applicable to a variety of switching 
situations. Studies of output switching and input switching are equally 
feasible using this approach. In addition, the switching tasks are 
completely subject self-paced. This is similar to the type of attention 
switching found in everyday life, and tends to increase the 
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generalizabilty of the findings. 
The paradigm also has some disadvantages. Some information is lost 
in the averaging involved in the switching time formula. For example, in 
a memory-perceptual switching situation, the attention switch is executed 
in two directions: 1) from memory to perception, and 2) from perception 
to memory. There is no reason to assume that these two switches will take 
the same amount of time. The switching time formula does not provide 
separate switching times for these two switches, yielding instead the 
average of the two. 
In addition, the tasks used in switching time studies are often 
highly simplified, and thus may lack some ecological validity. This 
criticism is not peculiar to the switching time paradigm, and has been 
leveled at attention and memory studies in general (Neisser, 1978). The 
simplified situations are often necessary to accurately isolate the 
switching effects form confounding variables. 
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